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Christopher Waters* New Hacktivists and the Old
Concept of Levee en Masse
The purpose of this article is to contribute to the continuing debate over the
relevance of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to cyberwar It does so by
taking what is often said to be a particularly archaic aspect of IHL, the French
Revolutionary notion of levee en masse, and asking whether the concept could
have relevance in the cyber context. The article treats levee en masse as a litmus
test for the law's relevance; if this IHL "relic" could have relevance in the cyber
context, then the continued relevance of the larger body of rules should also be
less doubtful.
Cet article se veut une contribution au debat qui a cours sur la pertinence du droit
humanitaire international (DHI) dans le contexte d'une cyber-guerre. Pour ce faire,
Iauteur utilise ce qui est souvent qualifie d'aspect particulierement archa)'que du
DHI, le concept frangais revolutionnaire de levee en masse, et demande si ce
concept pourrait 6tre pertinent dans le contexte du cyberige. Larticle traite la
levee en masse comme critere decisif de la pertinence de la loi; si ce vestige
du DHI peut 6tre pertinent dans le contexte du cyberige, alors le maintien de
la pertinence de I'ensemble des lois et des reglements devrait aussi 6tre moins
douteux.
* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor. Earlier versions of this paper were presented
at the Canadian Red Cross Conference on Cyberwarfare in Toronto in September 2013 and the Annual
Conference of the Canadian Council on International Law in Ottawa in November 2013.
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Introduction
It is common to suggest that war has changed significantly since
International Humanitarian Law's (IHL) core instruments-the 1949
Geneva Conventions and their two Additional Protocols of 19771-were
drafted. For some, the ground has simply shifted too much for the rules
to be meaningful, or at least for the rules to be implemented in their
entirety.2 Famously, a British defence minister went so far as to say in
2006 that unless we reconsidered the law "we risk continuing to fight a
21 st Century conflict with 20th Century rules."3 The shifting twenty-first-
century terrain apparently involves the altered scope of the battlefield
(including the urbanisation of warfare and the global war on terrorism)
and the appearance of new actors on the battlefield (transnational armed
groups and private military and security companies, among others). While
a historian might point out that there is actually little new in any of these
developments (and on the one hundredth anniversary of the start of World
War I we might bear in mind that the trigger for the war was an act of
1. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members ofArmed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75
UNTS 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75
UNTS 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12
August 1949, 75 UNTS 287. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of J2 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125
UNTS 3 [Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June
1977, 1125 UNTS 609.
2. See, for example, Dan Belz, "Is International Humanitarian Law Lapsing into Irrelevance in
the War on International Terror?" (2006) 7:97 Theor Inq L 6; Rosa E Brooks, "War Everywhere:
Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror" (2004) 153 U Pa
L Rev 675 at 706; Gabor Rona, "International Law Under Fire: Interesting Times For International
Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the 'War on Terror"' (2003) 27 Fletcher F World Aff 55. These
concerns are not restricted to the English language literature. See, e.g., the Introduction to Abdelwahab
Biad & Paul Tavernier eds, Le droit international humanitaire face aux dofis du XXI siecle, (Brussels:
Bruylant, 2012).
3. Paul Reynolds, "The Rules of War: Too '20th Century?,"' BBC News (4 April 2006), online:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4875694.stm>.
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terrorism),4 what cannot be denied is that new or emerging weapons,
categorically different from what might have been anticipated in earlier
decades, have appeared. Recent weapon technologies that may be game
changers, posing an existential challenge to IHL, include nanotechnology,
drones and automated weapons systems or "killer robots." Perhaps
nowhere is the alleged unsuitability-even the quaintness-of IHL more
apparent to sceptics than in the cyberwar context. As Wallace and Reeves,
two West Point officers and law professors put it, "[a]pplying the law of
armed conflict, as currently constructed, in this environment is 'highly
problematic' as legal obligations are almost impossible to discern."5
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the continued relevance
of IHL to cyberwar. It does so by taking what is often said to be a
particularly archaic aspect of IHL, the French Revolutionary notion of
a lev~e en masse, and asking whether the concept could have relevance
in the cyber context. I treat lev~e en masse as a litmus test for the law's
relevance; if this IHL relic could have relevance in the cyber context, then
the continued relevance of the larger body of rules should also be less
doubtful. Although drafted for broader purposes than a reply, this use of
lev~e en masse as a test case may be considered the inverse of Wallace and
Reeves's argument. They write:
when specific provisions of the law of armed conflict are applied in cyber
warfare, it is apparent that generalities do not address the truly "wicked"
nature of the problem. One particular example-trying to reconcile the
concept of levee en masse with the "cyber conflicts between nations and
ad hoc assemblages"-illustrates how ill-suited, and often impractical,
the existing law of armed conflict can be when applied in the cyber
context.
6
It would be facile to suggest that IHL treaties are perfect the way they are.
It would be desirable to revise IHL by bringing the texts fully up to date
with respect to the most modem means and methods of war. At the same
time, it must be borne in mind that no sooner would the treaties be revised
than the means and methods of warfare will have changed further. Whether
it be e-commerce or reproductive technology, written law will generally
4. Namely the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne.
5. David Wallace & Shane R Reeves, "The Law of Armed Conflict's 'Wicked' Problem: Levee en
Masse in Cyber Warfare" (2013) 89 IntL Stud 646 at 648.
6. Ibid at 649. Others have ignored levee en masse altogether, despite the concept's relevance to
their arguments. For example, Susan W Brenner & Leo L Clarke "Civilians in Cyberwar: Conscripts"
(2010) 43 Vanderbilt J Transnatl L 1011 at 1015 have compellingly demonstrated that "civilians are
destined to play an active role in cyber hostilities" and discuss ways of conscripting civilians into
cyber defence; however, they make no mention of levee en masse.
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lag somewhere behind technical innovation. It would be foolish to say,
however, that general contract law principles or family law principles do
not apply to emerging technologies and cannot be purposively interpreted
to meet new challenges.' My point here is that until the key IHL treaties
are revised or a cyber-specific treaty regime put in place (and both of these
scenarios seem unlikely in the near future), it is inaccurate and dangerous
to suggest that IHL does not speak meaningfully to the questions which
arise through the use of cyber or other emerging weaponry.
The interpretive evolution of law and the application of law to new
facts, and indeed to changing conditions of life, are standard fare for
lawyers. This is perhaps especially true for international lawyers. Article
31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that treaties
should be interpreted in light of their "object and purpose"8 and the
International Court of Justice has not been shy about interpreting treaties
in light of new developments.9 Thus in holding that the word "commercial"
included the transport of passengers under a nineteenth-century navigation
treaty between Costa Rica and Nicaragua over the San Juan River, the
Court said in 2009: "even assuming that the notion of 'commerce' does not
have the same meaning today as it did in the mid-nineteenth century, it is
the present meaning which must be accepted for purposes of applying the
Treaty."1 Furthermore, the Martens Clause in IHL treaties precludes static
understandings of the law pertaining to international armed conflict. As
first formulated in the Preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention (II) with
respect to the laws and customs of war on land, it states:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High
Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in
the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain
under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as
they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from
the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience."
7. On the application of the common law of contracts to e-commerce, see ProCD v Matthew
Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services Inc, 86 F 3d 1447 (CA 7 Wis 1996).
8. Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, 23 May 1969, UNTS 1155, at 331 (entered into force
27 January 1980).
9. See generally, Campbell McLachlan, "The Evolution of Treaty Obligations in International
Law" in Georg Nolte, ed, Treaties and Subsequent Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
10. Case Concerning Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) Judgment, [2009]
ICJ Rep 213 at para 70.
11. Convention (II) withRespectto the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land and itsAnnex: Regulations
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 29 July 1899, (entered into force 4 September
1900), online: ICRC <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/150?OpenDocument>.
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Although interpretations of the clause vary considerably (at its narrowest
it means that customary law exists in parallel to treaty law and at its widest
that humanitarian principles beyond hard law remain relevant),12 the door
is left open for normative evolution for the purposes of human protection.
Finally, when constructing IHL treaties as a whole, it is important to note
that the instruments specifically contemplate new means and methods of
war. Notably, Additional Protocol I states that "it is prohibited to employ
weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to
cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering" and requires that states
ensure the development or use of new weapons complies with IHL.13
Thus gone are the days when states could, albeit with limited plausibility,
argue that aerial bombardment of civilians was unregulated since it was
not specifically regulated. 4 With these principles in mind, we can turn in
Part I to a brief exploration of the origins and nature of leve en masse and
then, in Part II, probe its applicability in the cyber context.
I. Leve en masse
The French Revolutionary origins of the leve en masse are well
established. Decisively turning a page on the traditional raising and
commanding of armies by European princes, the Proclamation of the
Revolution's National Convention of 16 August 1793 called for a mass
levy of the French population: "From this moment until such time as
its enemies shall have been driven from the soil of the Republic, all
Frenchmen are in permanent requisition for the services of the armies."15
As the revolutionary Bertrand Barbre put it, "Tout citoyen est soldat quand
il s 'agit de combattre la tyrannie.1 6 While the 1793 Proclamation was
in one sense conscription, a governmental levy requiring all young men
to fight and for other categories of citizen to attend to other duties, the
lev~e en masse also represented a popular and "spontaneous" uprising
against foreign invaders. The new force relied on patriotism, speeches
12. Rupert Ticehurst, "The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict" (1997) 317 IRRC,
online: ICRC <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jnhy.htm>. Furthermore, the
International Law Commission, in commentary on its final draft articles on the law of treaties, observed
that "[w]hen a treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does and the other does not enable
the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and the object and purposes of the treaty demand
that the former interpretation should be adopted." United Nations, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission 1966: Volume II, A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add. 1 (1967) at 219.
13. Additional ProtocolI, supra note 1 at arts 35(2) and 36, respectively.
14. See R Nelson & C Waters, "The Allied Bombing of German Cities during the Second World War
from a Canadian Perspective" (2012) 14 J Hist Intl L 87.
15. See generally WG Rabus, "A New Definition of the 'Levee en Masse," (1977) 24 NILR 232.
16. As cited inRabus, ibid at 232.
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and pamphleteering to raise men, and these fighters were not trained,
disciplined or commanded in traditional fashion.
The concept of the citizen-soldier acting spontaneously in the
face of a foreign invader was enshrined in various nineteenth-century
legal instruments, including the 1863 Lieber Code, the 1874 Brussels
Declaration and the Oxford Manual of 1880.17 The 1899 and 1907 Hague
Regulations codified the principle in treaty form, and the wording used
by the Regulations has largely been carried over to the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949. This latter Convention, the "Prisoners Convention,"
defines lev~e en masse for the purpose of determining who is a privileged
belligerent entitled to prisoner of war status upon capture by the enemy. As
explained by Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, article 4(6) of the Convention
states that the list of privileged belligerents includes
[i]nhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the
enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without
having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided
they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war. Aside
from its provision in treaties, levee en masse also-uncontroversially it
should be noted-has customary law status.'8
Unlike other privileged combatants, participants in a lev~e en masse,
driven by patriotism (or fear) to defend their country, do not need a
regular command structure, uniform or distinctive insignia. The lev~e was
conceptualized as being temporally limited to the time after an invasion
and before occupation by the enemy or the incorporation of the citizen-
soldiers into the army. In the view of many then, the lev~e en masse was
a limited exception to IHL's usual categories of actors. The exceptional
nature of this category is reflected in the Canadian 2001 Law of Armed
Conflict (LOAC) Manual in its chapter on Combatant Status:
As a general rule, civilians are considered non-combatants and cannot
lawfully engage in hostilities. There is, however, an exception to this
rle for inhabitants of a territory that has not been occupied by an enemy.
Where they have not had time to form themselves into regular armed
units, inhabitants of a non-occupied territory are lawful combatants if: a.
on the approach of the enemy they spontaneously take up arms to resist
the invading forces; b. they carry arms openly; and c. they respect the
LOAC.
17. For a legal history of the concept, see Emily Crawford, "Regulating the Irregular: International
Humanitarian Law and the Question of Civilian Participation in Armed Conflicts" (2011) 18:1 J Intl L
& Pol'y 163.
18. Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law
Volume I: Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 384.
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As Baxter describes the anomaly, "[t]he law of war has had to evolve an
uneasy... compromise between the legitimate defence of regular belligerent
forces and the demands of patriotism .... The protected position afforded
the members of the lev~e en masse is a monument to these sentiments...."19
There are clear World War II examples of levee en masse, including
the resistance of the Cretan population in the face of a German invasion
in 1941.20 Contemporary examples are more limited.2 1 In analysing the
status of Bosnian Muslim forces around Srebrenica in 1992, where "very
few individuals possessed a complete uniform" or other "fixed distinctive
emblems recognisable at a distance," the International Criminal Tribunal
forthe formerYugoslavia (ICTY) Trial Chamber found that alev~e en masse
situation briefly existed.22 Similarly, Georgian resistance had elements of
lev~e en masse during the Russian invasion of Georgia proper in 2008,
when young Georgian men drove towards the front lines and attempted
to bolster regular forces.23 The paucity of contemporary examples may
be due in part to changing means of methods of conventional, non-cyber
warfare. As Ipsen puts it,
in modem-day armed conflicts the levee en masse has become less
significant because, as a mle, the regular armed forces of an attacking
party are armed to a degree that simply cannot be countered with
the weapons available to a spontaneous resistance (such as hunting
weapons) .24
The more significant factor, however, may simply be the decline of
international armed conflict vis-i-vis non-international armed conflict.
The lack of contemporary instances of lev~e en masse has led many
to consider it an anachronism. For example, Solis suggests that "lev~e en
masse may be a historical relic" and Draper posits that lev~e en masse is
19. Richard Baxter, "So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency': Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs" 28
(1951) BYIL 335.
20. Rabus, supra note 15.
21. Crawford, supra note 17.
22. Prosecutor v Naser Oric, IT-03-68-T, Judgment (30 June 2006) at para 135 (International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber), online: ICTY <http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/oric/tjug/en/ori-jud060630e.pdf>.
23. See Nicholas Kulish & Michael Schwirtz, "Sons Missing in Action, If Indeed They Found
It," The New York Times (12 August 2008) A8, online: The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/08/12/world/europe/12iht-12civilians.15190553.html?pagewanted-all& r-0>.
24. Knut Ipsen, "Combatants and Non-Combatants" in Dieter Fleck, ed, The Handbook of
International Humanitarian Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 94.
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"extremely rare and limited.... "25 However, despite the reports of leve
en masse's death, and the image of leve en masse as "an ignorant unruly
crowd waving pitchforks about,"26 there is no compelling reason to be
rid of the category of fighter. Indeed, there is little reason to believe that
the category will fall into desuetude in the long term; international armed
conflict or invasions combined with spontaneous resistance by citizen-
soldiers are unlikely to disappear. Furthermore, as the ICRC's customary
law study points out, "While this exception may be considered of limited
current application, it is still repeated in many military manuals, including
very recent ones, and it therefore continues to be regarded as a valid
possibility."2 There are also conceptual reasons to keep it. As Emily
Crawford writes, though without reference to the cyber context:
Given the apparent difficulties in defining when a civilian is participating
in armed conflict, the existence of a well-accepted set of mles that
determine exactly when a civilian may legitimately participate in armed
conflict is clearly advantageous. Levee en masse thus remains a useful,
if infrequently used, categorisation. Its accepted position in custom and
treaty law places levee en masse in the unique situation of being one of
the very few international laws that legitimises civilian participation in
international aimed conflict. Given the long history of difficulties and
resistance encountered whenever the laws of anmed conflict relating to
participants have been debated, the advantages of an existing, accepted
law on civilian participation in armed conflict seems obvious.
Despite the arguments in favour of keeping leve en masse, it cannot
be denied that the category arises rarely and strikes many as being
anachronistic. At first glance then, if there is going to be any aspect of
IHL which bears no applicability in most modern conflicts (aside perhaps
from the protection of tobacco use by prisoners of war) and indeed shows
the futility of applying IHL notions to cyberwarfare, it is leve en masse.
II. Leve en masse in the cyber context
In a ground-breaking 2006 article, Audrey Kurth Cronin called "cyber-
mobilisation" the new leve en masse. She described how connectivity
was being used to recruit and direct civilians in combat or terrorism, often
using conventional weapons. But what of cyberwarfare itself rather than
25. Gary D Solis, The Law ofArmed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 201. Ultimately Solis muses, "[p]erhaps future levees
en masse ... are not as improbable on today's battlefields as believed." GIAD Draper, "The Legal
Classification of Belligerent Individuals" in Michael A Meyer & Hilaire McCoubrey, eds, Reflections
on Law andArmed Conflicts, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998) at 202.
26. Rabus, supra note 15 at 232-233.
27. Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 18 at 387.
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cyber tools of command and control? Could hacktivists and others, using
cyber weapons, constitute or be part of a lev~e en masse? In 2009 an expert
consultative process on determining which, and how, rules of IHL could
be applied in the cyberwarfare context was launched under the auspices
of NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. It resulted
in the 2013 Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Warfare.28 The Tallinn Manual is not unusual in the sense that there have
been several reports in recent years which have sought to authoritatively
clarify or provide operational guidance to states and commanders.
These include the Copenhagen Process on detainees, 2 9 the Manual on
International Law Applicable to Air andMissile Warfare,3" and the ICRC's
report on Direct Participation in Hostilities.31 It is important to note that
these reports have not purported to definitively establish or codify legal
norms. The Tallinn Manual, which consists of 69 rules, makes a significant
contribution to the discussion on how IHL applies in the cyberwar context.
Rule 27 does, albeit tepidly and with serious qualification, provide for
lev~e en masse. It states: "In an international armed conflict, inhabitants of
unoccupied territory who engage in cyber operations as part of a lev~e en
masse enjoy combatant immunity and prisoner of war status. 3 2 However,
it appears from the commentary to the rule that the group of experts was
divided on the lev~e's continued relevance. The commentary suggests
that while a lev~e en masse would be theoretically possible, it would
nonetheless be improbable in the cyber context. Other observers, notably
Wallace and Reeves, have reacted with incredulity to the notion that the
lev~e en masse could have continued relevance.33 There appear to be four
main challenges to the continued currency of lev~e en masse in the cyber
context. These challenges arise with respect to (1) the limited number of
potential participants in a lev~e en masse (where is the en masse?), (2)
whether a physical invasion needs to occur, (3) whether cyber defence
could involve attacks behind the front lines and (4) how the requirement
28. Michael N Schmitt, ed, Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
29. Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations, 19
October 2012, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, online: <http://um.dk/en/-/media/UM/
English-site/Documents/Po litics-and-diplomacy/ Copenhangen%2 OPr cess %20Principles%2 0
and 0 o2Guidelines.pdf >.
30. Harvard University HPCR, HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile
Warfare, 15 May 2009, online: HPCR <http://www.ilresearch.org/amw/manual/>.
31. Nils Melzer, Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under
International Humanitarian Law (Geneva: ICRC, 2009).
32. Schmitt, supra note 28 at 102.
33. Wallace & Reeves, supra note 5.
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that participants carry arms openly can be met. I consider these four
challenges in turn.
First, as the Tallinn Manual itself says, "It is unclear whether lev~e en
masse can be composed solely of a significant portion of the cyber-capable
members of the population" as normally a lev~e en masse will involve a
large segment of the population. It is true that not everyone has the means
and expertise to participate in cyber warfare. However, not everyone
engaged in a lev~e en masse need be capable of doing the same thing
or in fact doing the same thing. In the original French lev~e en masse,
the 1793 decree provided that "[t]he young men shall go to battle; the
married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women shall
make tents and clothes...."" In the cyber context, some participants may
be identifying vulnerabilities in the enemy's target systems, others may
be developing malware to exploit those vulnerabilities, and still others
might participate in denial of service attacks or defences.35 Furthermore,
these sorts of attacks are integrally linked to online social networks, thus
potentially opening up the cyber battlefield to millions of "netizens."
Individuals using social media can play a role in cyberwar beyond merely
propagandizing, mobilising and coordinating the population to resist. As
James Carafano in his book Wiki at War puts it: "Almost any individual or
group has the capacity to wreak some kind of online havoc, from stealing
information and services to corrupting data, covertly monitoring or taking
remote control of computers, and shutting down entire networks."36 At any
rate, there are perhaps fewer bright lines between cyber and conventional
warfare than are sometimes thought; for example, the Stuxnet attack on
Iran's nuclear program "featured many of the attributes of conventional
military operations including intelligence operations and mid-operation
fragmentary orders.137 These activities may be centrally directed-as
they certainly were in the Stuxnet attack-but may not be as well, at
least not in any traditional sense of a command structure. But as lev~e en
masse specifically excludes the need for a command structure this is not
34. "Decree Establishing the Levee en Masse, 23 August 1793" in David Ralston, Soldiers and
States: Civil-Military Relations in Modern Europe (Boston: DC Heath and Company, 1966) at 66.
35. Paraphrasing Michael Schmitt, "Classification of Cyber Conflict" (2012) 17:2 JCSL at 256.
36. James Carafino, Wiki at War (College Station: Texas A& M University Press, 2012) at 111.
37. Sean Watts, "The Notion of Combatancy in Cyber Warfare" (paper delivered at the 4th
International Conference on Cyber Conflict, Tallinn, 2012), (2012) NATO CCD COE Publications
at 244, online: CCD COE <http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/2012proceedings/4 2 Watts
TheNotionOfCombatancyInCyberWarfare.pdf>.
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problematic.38 Furthermore, the means and expertise to engage in cyber
attack or defence are only increasing, leaving us with the curious possibility
that lev~e en masse will become more relevant overtime; that in fact cyber
warfare will have breathed new life into an old concept. Citing examples
from the Russian-Georgian and Arab-Israeli conflicts, among others,
Heather Harrison Dinniss suggests, "[n]ot only are military networks a
prime target for enemy forces, they come under increasing attack from
civilians during times of war as well."39 More recently, one can point to
cyber attacks by Ukrainian and Russian "netizens" before and after the
Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014 as evidence that cyberwarfare is
not a phenomenon reserved to a few players. 41 It seems to me premature
to declare that civilian engagement in cyberwar will not occur en masse.
The second challenge posed to the applicability of lev~e en masse
is whether the category could apply in the case of a civilian population
countering a cyber attack or whether a physical invasion by the enemy
has to occur. The majority of experts for the Tallinn Manual thought that
there had to be a physical invasion of national territory. The relevant
provision of the Third Geneva Convention states that the lev~e en masse
applies to "inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach
of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces."
Unless we are going to take an "original intent of the framers" perspective
reminiscent more of certain conservative strains in U.S. jurisprudence than
international legal understandings of treaty interpretation, it is unclear to
me why the enemy cannot "approach" in the cyber context. 41 It is a stretch
to conceive of an invasion as purely occurring in the virtual world. Indeed,
there must be violence at some point for IHL to apply at all-death to
persons or damage to actual objects42-but once that happens there is, by
its very nature, a kinetic invasion of sorts. Melzer has even argued that,
38. Ironically, as David Turns puts it: "Finally, 'hacktivists' generally-far from not having time to
organize themselves-tend to be very well organized; indeed, it is the very concentration and intensity
of their attacks that usually make them so effective." David Turns, "Cyber Warfare and the Notion of
Direct Participation in Hostilities," (2012) 17:2 J Confl & Sec L 279 at 293.
39. HeatherHarrisonDinniss, Cyber Warfare andtheLaws ofWar (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2012) at 172.
40. Nicole Perlroth, "Cyberattacks Rise as Ukraine Crisis Spills to Internet," The New York
Times (4 March 2014), online: The New York Times <http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/
cyberattacks -rise-as-ukraine-crisis -spills -on-the-internet/?php-tme& type-blogs&php-true&
type-blogs&hp& rAl>.
41. For an account of the "original intent of the framers" perspective and a suggestion that the
framers of the US Constitution themselves did not intend an ahistorical approach, see Powell H
Jefferson, "The Original Understanding of Original Intent" (1985) 98:5 Harv L Rev 885.
42. Article 49 ofAdditional Protocol], supra note 1, states that attacks are "acts of violence against
the adversary."
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[w]hile this category of persons has become ever less relevant in
traditional warfare, it may well come to be of practical importance in
cyberwarfare. Indeed, in cyber warfare territory is neither invaded nor
occupied, which may significantly prolong the period during which a
levee en masse can operate.43
The third major objection to the notion that lev~e en masse has
continued relevance in the cyber context can be termed the "behind
enemy lines" issue. Historically a lev~e was understood as involving a
general uprising of the population to repel an invading force back across
the national border; it did not comprise attacks deep into enemy territory.
Could cyber operations by civilians, not against the actual invading forces
but against military objectives well behind the lines, fit into this category?
Again, on the language of the Third Geneva Convention, there is no need
to exclude this possibility. But more broadly, under any interpretation of
military necessity-a bedrock principle of IHL-there is no reason to limit
cyber operations by defenders to countering the actual invading troops.
Let us take an example from the 2008 Georgia-Russia war. Russia-
presumably, but not conclusively, through state agents-quickly knocked
out Georgia's cyber infrastructure.44 According to the European Union's
fact finding mission into the conflict:
It looks quite apparent that significant cyber attacks were launched
against Georgia in the course of the conflict. Most Georgian government
[including the Ministry of Defence] and media sites were unavailable
or defeated at some time during the first days of the conflict .... Some
experts believe that these attacks may have reduced Georgian decision-
making capability.45
Presumably, these attacks were launched in Moscow, St. Petersburg or
Sochi, and not by Russian troops and tank crews crossing the border. If
territory is a non-factor in terms of the source of the cyber attacks then
surely it must be in terms of the cyber defence required to repel it. Military
necessity has limits naturally-as is often said, it must be balanced against
the principles of humanity and distinction-but no such considerations
anse in this case. If IHL is in any sense a practical regime, limiting cyber
lev~e en masse defences to kinetic troops crossing a border would be an
43. Nils Melzer, "Cyberwarfare and International Law" (2011) UNIDIR at 34, online: UNIDIR
<http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/cyberwarfare-and-international-law-382.pdf>.
44. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report: Volume II
(September 2009) at 420, online: CEIIG < http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html>.
45. Ibidat217.
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impractical result, creating a moral hazard where citizen defenders could
not legally defend themselves.
The fourth challenge in applying levee en masse in the cyber context
is the requirement to carry arms openly. Wallace and Reeves write:
Levee en masse participants, with no distinctive signs recognizable
from a distance, are therefore expected to ostensibly carry traditionally
recognized weapons since this is the only external display advertising
their combatant status. This singular distinction requirement is not
possible in a cyber war where the weapons are computers. 6
The anonymous nature of civilian engagement with cyberwar is endemic
and not a particular problem of lev~e en masse. Writing about cyberxarfare
in the context of direct participation of hostilities, David Turns says:
It is rather difficult to see precisely how these criteria could be applied
in a cyber-conflict. Conceivably the taking up of arms could be loosely
compared with the execution of CW commands against hostile systems,
but how would they 'carry arms openly' in this context? Indeed, what
would the 'anus' in question be-laptop computers, perhaps? If on the
other hand the 'arms' are considered to be the software that executes
the cyber attacks, how can they by nature ever be deemed to be carried
,openly'? 4
These are legitimate questions. But, again, taking a purposive approach,
we can ask what is at stake in the requirement to carry arms openly.
Ultimately it is the perfidious use of weapons that poses difficulty, not
camouflage or other ruses of war. Carrying one's weapons openly in the
conventional context, even in the most literal-minded interpretation, does
not of course mean that a citizen-soldier could not take cover behind an
abandoned house or lie low in the bushes to avoid detection. As the ICRC
Commentary to the Third Geneva Convention puts it with respect to
resistance movements:
[Although the difference may seem slight, there must be no confusion
between carrying arms "openly" and carrying them "visibly" or
"ostensibly." Surprise is a factor in any war operation, whether or not
involving regular troops. This provision is intended to guarantee the
loyalty of the fighting, it is not an attempt to prescribe that a hand-
grenade or a revolver must be carried at belt or shoulder rather than in a
pocket or under a coat. The enemy must be able to recognize partisans
46. Wallace & Reeves, supra note 5 at 660. In fairness, Wallace and Reeves do not conclude that
"anything goes" in cyberwarfare. Indeed they propose a creative solution, treating participants in a
levee en masse more like irregular troops; although not needing to cany arms openly they would have
other aspects of armed forces such as a command structure.
47. Turns, supra note 38 at 293.
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as combatants in the same way as members of regular armed forces,
whatever their weapons. Thus, a civilian could not enter a military post
on a false pretext and then open fire, having taken unfair advantage of
his adversaries.48
Similarly, there is no principled reason why a citizen-hacktivist cannot seek
to avoid detection when attacking lawful targets. And, as a practical matter,
if detection occurs, he or she is of course targetable. What the hacktivist
cannot do is use a hospital or school computer or network for launching
cyber attacks. As Melzer has suggested, "a possible solution would be to
consider this requirement [to carry arms openly] as fulfilled when cyber
operations are not conducted by feigning protected, non-combatant status
within the meaning of the prohibition of perfidy."49 Sean Watts also adopts
a functional approach to distinction generally, arguing that
[f]ar more than the outward appearance of individuals conducting CNA
[Computer Network Attacks], distinction in CNA demands attention to
the actual conduct of the attack-the target chosen, the pathways of entry,
and the means used to achieve destruction or other harmful effects."
Admittedly, one of the problems of taking this functional approach is that
it may conflate the requirement to carry arms openly with the other criteria
of the definition of levee en masse, namely the obligation to respect the
laws of war. However, it does represent a viable and practical approach to
interpreting Article 4 of Geneva Convention III in light of technological
developments.
This paper's argument that a hacktivist may be a lawful combatant
in the face of a cyber or kinetic invasion underscores the importance of
the obligation to respect the laws of war. Dinstein suggests that this latter
criterion
is the key to understanding the philosophy underlying the distinction
between lawful and unlawful combatants. Unless a combatant is willing
himself to respect LOIAC [Law of International Armed Conflict], he is
estopped from relying on that body of law when desirous of enjoying its
benefits."
48. Jean de Preux, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Vol III (Geneva:
ICRC, 1960) at 61.
49. Melzer, supra note 43 at 34.
50. Watts, supra note 37 at 246.
51. Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct ofHostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, 2nd
ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 39. Rabus, supra note 15 at 240, goes further,
arguing that the treaty provisions on levee en masse should be amended to drop the requirement to
carry arms openly and to maintain only the obligation to respect the laws of war.
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If it is the case that the gravamen of the levee en masse is that when
the population is defending itself against assailants it must respect the laws
of war, then, to paraphrase Rabus, 2 what is needed is a serious effort to
disseminate IHL norms to cyber aware and cyber capable populations.
This need has been identified by the ICRC, among others, although
states (despite their dissemination obligations with respect to civilian
populations) have done little in this regard. 3 Whether as participants in a
leve en masse or in some sort of other lawful combatancy, the ability of
hacktivist-combatants to understand and apply the basic principles of IHL
will be crucial to their status and more importantly, to the protection of the
civilian population and other potential victims of warfare. This leads to a
final point, or at least a final question. Leaving aside moral imperatives
to comply with the substance of the law, the flip side of the arguments
for inclusion of hacktivists within a category of lawful combatants is as
follows: if they can't be lawful combatants when striving to act lawfully,
then why obey the laws of armed conflict at all?
Conclusion
It is not the intent of this article to suggest that leve en masse is an ideal
fit with cyberwarfare. The notion of hacktivists acting spontaneously
and en masse may indeed be a stretch, although, as suggested above,
paradoxically cyberwarfare may make the concept more relevant than
ever. But I have attempted to make the argument here that even in the face
of one of IHL's so-called obsolete categories, a category only tepidly and
reluctantly recognised by the drafters of the Tallinn Manual and derided
by others as being an absurdity in modem warfare, the key IHL treaties
remain relevant and adaptable. There may be a better way to deal with
cyberwarfare-through revised Geneva Conventions, through a dedicated
cyberwarfare treaty or through the creation of an international cyber
security organisation among other options. Until then it should be made
52. Rabus, supra note 15 at 237.
53. While more discretion is given to states with respect to dissemination among the civilian
population, as opposed to military personnel, in the Geneva Conventions Article 83 of Additional
Protocol I, supra note 1, provides that:"The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in
time of armed conflict, to disseminate the Conventions and this Protocol as widely as possible in their
respective countries and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military
instruction and to encourage the study thereof by the civilian population, so that those instruments
may become known to the armed forces and to the civilian population." Though not directed at the
norms of cyberwarfare per se, the JCRC's dissemination efforts with respect to video gaming may
be of particular importance in reaching young cybercitizens; see ICRC, "Video Games and the Laws
of War," online: JCRC <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/film/2013/09-28-ih-video-
games.htm>.
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clear that there is a body of law regulating cyber means and methods of
war.
54
54. A point made by Cordula Droege, "Get off my cloud: cyber warfare, international humanitarian
law, and the protection of civilians" (2012) 94:886 IRRC 533 at 540; Michael Gervais, "CyberAttacks
and the Laws of War" (2012) 30 BJL 525.
